Operation Torch

Operation Torch, major Allied amphibious operation in French North Africa during World War II. It began on November 8, 1942, with the landing of 107,000 British and U.S. troops at Casablanca, Morocco, and the Algerian cities of Algiers and Oran. French authorities concluded an armistice with the Allies three days later. The landings, which came days after the victory of Gen. Bernard Montgomery’s British Eighth Army at the Second Battle of El-Alamein, signaled the beginning of the end of Axis power in North Africa.

Planning the invasion of French North Africa

The Anglo-U.S. invasion of northwest Africa had its origins at the Arcadia Conference in Washington, D.C., in the winter of 1941–42 and at meetings in London the following July. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, whose armies had suffered enormous losses in the opening months of the German invasion of the Soviet Union, had been pressuring the Western Allies to open a second front against Germany, and Allied planners debated how they might most effectively engage the military of the Third Reich.

Britannica Quiz

Pop Quiz: 17 Things to Know About World War II

American strategists advocated the Bolero Plan, a buildup of forces in Great Britain in advance of an assault on Hitler’s Fortress Europe in 1942 (Operation Sledgehammer) or 1943 (Operation Roundup). The British, however, favored an invasion of North Africa (Operations Gymnast and Super-Gymnast) that would secure the Mediterranean theater once and for all. Owing to a number of factors—most notably the American decision to initiate offensive operations in the Pacific at Guadalcanal in the southern Solomon Islands and the seemingly precarious position of the British in Egypt after the fall of Tobruk—the British eventually prevailed. The combined operation in North Africa was dubbed Operation Torch, and it was agreed that the supreme command of the invasion should be given to an American. On July 26, 1942, Maj. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, whom U.S. Army chief of staff Gen. George C. Marshall had chosen as commander of the U.S. forces in the European theater, was given the post.

The British chiefs of staff, spurred by Prime Minister Winston Churchill, had proposed October 7, 1942, as the target date for the operation, but U.S. planners recommended November 7 as “the earliest reasonable date for landing of the forces based on availability of combat loaders.” (The availability of landing craft would be a major factor in the planning of sometimes competing amphibious operations throughout the war.) On the question of the landing site, the respective views were even wider apart: the British urged that the landings should be made in North Africa, on the Mediterranean coast, so that a quick advance to Tunisia would be possible. The U.S. chiefs of staff were anxious to confine the landings to the Casablanca area in the west, on the Atlantic coast of Morocco, because they feared not only opposition from Vichy French forces in the area but also a hostile reaction from Francisco Franco’s Spain and possibly a German counterstroke against Gibraltar. Eisenhower and his staff, however, were inclined to agree with the British view, and his first outline plan, formulated on August 9, 1942, was devised as a compromise: it proposed simultaneous landings inside and outside the Mediterranean but only as far east as Algiers.

In the final plan, the Atlantic coast landing to capture Casablanca was to be made by the all-American Western Task Force under Maj. Gen. George S. Patton. Patton’s 35,000 troops included the 3rd Infantry, 2nd Armored, and most of the 9th Infantry divisions. This force was transported directly from the United States by a U.S. Navy flotilla under the command of Rear Adm. H.K. Hewitt, and it assembled at sea on October 24, 1942. After securing Casablanca, Patton was to establish communications with the Center Task Force, which had the mission of capturing Oran.

The Center Task Force consisted of 39,000 U.S. troops of the 1st Infantry and 1st Armored divisions, as well as a complement of U.S. Army Rangers, under Maj. Gen. Lloyd R. Fredendall. It was landed and escorted by a Royal Navy force led by Commodore Thomas Troubridge. For the operation against Algiers, the naval component of the Eastern Task Force was entirely British and commanded by Vice Adm. Sir Harold Burrough. The assault force consisted of 23,000 British commando and infantry troops and 10,000 American troops under the command of U.S. Maj. Gen. Charles Ryder. The largely British landing force was given an American commander in light of French hostility toward the British, which remained strong more than two years after the British attack on the French fleet at Mers el-Kebir. The Center and Eastern task forces sailed from England on October 25 under British naval escort.

Adm. Sir Andrew B. Cunningham was naval commander in chief for the operation; his responsibilities included protection against attack by the Italian and Vichy French fleets. The assigned air forces were commanded by Air Marshal Sir William L. Welsh and Brig. Gen. James H. Doolittle, respectively. The Western Task Force was supported by 171 aircraft from 4 U.S. Navy aircraft carriers and the Center Task Force by 57 British planes from 3 carriers and by 2 U.S. fighter groups from Gibraltar. At Algiers the British furnished air support from 4 carriers and from Gibraltar.

Diplomatic efforts and Operation Flagpole

The invasion of French North Africa was a political conquest as much as a military one. Long before the landings, U.S. diplomats in Vichy France and in Vichy-controlled Algeria and Morocco had sounded out French sentiment with regard to American occupation and reported favorable findings to Allied high command. Robert Murphy, the chief U.S. diplomatic representative in North Africa, discreetly elicited support from French officers whom he felt were likely to sympathize with the project. He relied particularly on Gen. Charles Mast, commander of the troops in the Algiers sector, and on Gen. Antoine Émile Béthouart, commander of the Casablanca sector.

Mast suggested that a senior Allied military representative should come secretly to Algiers for backstage talks. Accordingly, on the night of October 21, 1942, an audacious plan dubbed Operation Flagpole was put into motion. U.S. Army Gen. Mark Clark flew to Gibraltar with four key staff officers, and the party was carried by the Royal Navy submarine HMS Seraph to a rendezvous at a coastal villa some 60 miles (100 km) west of Algiers. Clark, whose retinue now included a trio of British commando bodyguards, went ashore under the cover of darkness just after midnight on October 22, and Mast arrived just before dawn. Clark told Mast that a large U.S. force was being prepared for dispatch to North Africa and that it would be supported by British air and sea forces, but he abstained, in the interests of security, from giving Mast a clear idea of the time and places of the landings. This would deprive Mast and his associates of the information necessary to fully support the invasion.

The Clark-Mast conference also considered the matter of the most suitable French leader to rally the French forces in North Africa to the Allied side. The French commander in chief in Algeria, Gen. Alphonse Juin, had privately expressed a favorable inclination but then demonstrated a reluctance to take the initiative. François Darlan, commander in chief of all Vichy forces, had hinted to Murphy that he might be willing to bring the French over to the Allied side if he could be assured of U.S. military aid on a sufficiently large scale, but his longtime association with the collaborationist government did not inspire confidence. Charles de Gaulle was ruled out for the opposite reason—his defiance of Vichy leader Philippe Pétain in 1940 and his subsequent role in actions against Vichy forces in French West Africa, Syria, and Madagascar would make all French officers who had remained loyal to the Vichy government unwilling to accept his leadership.

As a result, the Americans readily accepted Mast’s recommendation that Gen. Henri Giraud was the best candidate for leadership of the French in North Africa. Giraud had been captured by the Germans in May 1940, but the 63-year-old officer had staged a daring escape from imprisonment at Königstein Fortress in April 1942. Giraud then made his way to southern France, and, just days before the Allied attack was to begin, he, his family, and his staff were extracted by the HMS Seraph in an Anglo-American mission dubbed Operation Kingpin.

Allied landings in North Africa

On November 5 Eisenhower established his command post at Gibraltar. Undetected by German U-boats or aircraft, the Central and Eastern task forces passed through the Strait of Gibraltar, and on November 8 landed their assault forces. Simultaneously, U.S. Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt broadcast an assurance to the French people that the Allies sought no territory. At the same time the Spanish government was notified that no operations were contemplated against its territory. At 4:35 am the Western Task Force began its landings.

Eastern Task Force (Algiers)

Landings were made at two beaches west, and one east, of Algiers, against spotty opposition. The operation there ran a relatively smooth course, thanks largely to Mast and his confederates. No serious resistance was met, except when the Allies tried to force an early entry into the harbor, and one of two British destroyers carrying commando and antisabotage parties was sunk by shell fire. Half an hour after midnight on November 8, Murphy notified Juin that overwhelmingly strong forces were about to land and urged him to issue orders that they were not to be resisted. Murphy stressed that they had come on the invitation of Giraud to aid France in liberating itself. Juin, unready to accept Giraud’s leadership, replied that the appeal must be submitted to Darlan, who happened to be in Algiers visiting his seriously ill son. Summoned to Juin’s villa, Darlan agreed to send a radio message to Pétain requesting authorization to deal with the situation on Pétain’s behalf. In the meantime, Darlan issued orders to the French troops and ships in the Algiers area to cease firing. Although that order did not apply to the Oran or Casablanca areas, Darlan authorized Juin to arrange a settlement for the whole of French North Africa. Moreover, it was agreed early in the evening that control of Algiers should be transferred to the Americans at 8:00 pm and that the Allies should have the use of the harbor at dawn on November 9. The afternoon of November 9 saw the arrival of Clark and British Gen. Kenneth Anderson, the latter of whom assumed command of the Allied First Army for the advance into Tunisia. Giraud had arrived a slightly earlier but found little support among his compatriots.

The Allied rules of engagement in Operation Torch were written in the hopes that French resistance would be minimal. If a unit came under fire from French forces, it would radio the message “batter up” to task force commanders. Authorization to return fire was given with the order “play ball.”

Center Task Force (Oran)

Landings against slight opposition were made at Arzew, some 20 miles (32 km) northeast of Oran, and at two beaches west of Oran. Two British cutters, carrying rangers and antisabotage parties into Oran to seize the port facilities, were disabled by fire from shore batteries and French naval craft; most of the personnel either became casualties or were captured. Three French destroyers which took to sea were sunk. A U.S. paratroop mission flying more than1,000 miles (1,600 km) from England to help capture airfields near Oran was scattered by a storm, but those troops that landed on target aided in seizing the Tafaraoui airfield. This operation would mark the first airborne assault by U.S. Army parachute infantry during the war. On the second day little progress was made, as French resistance stiffened, and a French counterattack on the flank of the Arzew beachhead threatened the whole plan of operations in that theater. At noon on November 10 Oran surrendered.

Casualties and significance

Pétain announced on November 10 that all authority in North Africa had been transferred from Darlan to Noguès. He had preceded this with a secret message to Darlan to say that he was disavowing him under German pressure and against his own wishes. Such double-talk was necessitated by the perilous situation in France, but it left French commanders in North Africa confused about the chain of command. Hitler resolved that uncertainty the following day, when he set aside the Franco-German Armistice of 1940 and ordered his forces to complete the German occupation of metropolitan France. Southern France was speedily overrun by German mechanized units, with six Italian divisions invading from the east. Darlan responded by rejecting the Vichy government. Subsequently Governor General Pierre Boisson announced the adherence of French West Africa to the Darlan regime. When Darlan was murdered on December 24, 1942, by an anti-Vichy radical, control passed to Giraud, although many of de Gaulle’s Free French refused to compromise with him. Ultimately, Darlan’s death opened the way for de Gaulle’s ascent.

Without Darlan’s assistance, the Allied campaign in northwestern Africa would have been significantly more challenging. Although the French troops in North Africa were widely spread out, they numbered nearly 120,000 and could have provided formidable opposition had they continued to resist the Allies. The only important matter in which Darlan’s cooperation failed to achieve the desired effect was the liberation and relocation of the main French fleet from Toulon to North Africa. The commander at Toulon, Adm. Jean-Baptiste Laborde, hesitated in responding to Darlan’s request because it was not accompanied by Pétain’s authorization, and a special emissary sent by Darlan was intercepted by the Germans. The delay forfeited the fleet’s chance of breaking out, but on November 27, 1942, the French managed to frustrate the German attempt to capture it by scuttling more than 70 ships.

Casualties in Operation Torch were relatively light on both sides, given the scale of the operation and the amount of territory ultimately delivered to the Allies. The U.S. suffered 526 killed and 837 wounded, while 574 British troops were killed in action. Some 1,300 French were killed; about 460 of these losses occurred during the naval engagements offshore. Operation Torch and subsequent offensives against the remaining Axis forces in Tunisia would end the German and Italian presence in North Africa. With North African Atlantic and Mediterranean ports open to Allied shipping, and Tunisia just 100 miles (160 km) from Sicily, North Africa would serve as a base for the Allied invasion of Sicily and, ultimately, the campaign against Italy.