Gulf of Tonkin incident
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- Miller Center - The Tonkin Gulf
- U.S. Naval Institute - The Truth About Tonkin
- Naval History and Heritage Command - Tonkin Gulf Crisis, August 1964
- Digital History - Exit Ngo Dinh Diem and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident
- HistoryNet - Gulf of Tonkin Incident: Reappraisal 40 Years Later
- U.S. Department of State - Office of the Historian - U.S. Involvement in the Vietnam War: The Gulf of Tonkin and Escalation, 1964
- Alpha History - The Gulf of Tonkin incident
- History Learning Site - Gulf of Tonkin 1964
- Date:
- August 2, 1964 - August 4, 1964
- Location:
- Gulf of Tonkin
- Participants:
- United States
- Vietnam
- Context:
- Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
- Vietnam War
- Key People:
- Lyndon B. Johnson
- Robert S. McNamara
- James Stockdale
Gulf of Tonkin incident, complex naval event in the Gulf of Tonkin, off the coast of Vietnam, that occurred from August 2 to August 4, 1964, during the Vietnam War. It was described to the U.S. Congress on August 5, 1964, as two unprovoked attacks by North Vietnamese torpedo boats on the U.S. destroyers Maddox and Turner Joy. The Gulf of Tonkin incident led to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which allowed President Lyndon B. Johnson to greatly escalate U.S. military involvement in the war.
Reconnaissance and raids
The Maddox and the Turner Joy of the U.S. Seventh Fleet were sent to the Gulf of Tonkin in 1964 in order to conduct reconnaissance and to intercept North Vietnamese communications in support of South Vietnamese war efforts. At the same time, the Vietnamese navy was undertaking a mission under the oversight of the U.S. Department of Defense to attack radar stations, bridges, and other such targets along North Vietnam’s coasts.
On the night of July 30–31, 1964, South Vietnamese commandos attacked North Vietnamese radar and military installations on Hon Me and Hon Ngu islands in the Gulf of Tonkin. The Maddox, on patrol in the area but probably unaware of the raids that had taken place, observed torpedo boats sent out in pursuit of the South Vietnamese vessels and thus withdrew, but it returned on August 1.
Events of August 2
The following day, on August 2, the Maddox found that it was being approached by three North Vietnamese torpedo boats. The Maddox fired warning shots, but the torpedo boats continued and opened fire in return. The Maddox called in air support from a nearby carrier, the Ticonderoga. In the ensuing firefight, one of the torpedo boats was badly damaged, but the Maddox escaped harm.
The event led the U.S. to believe that North Vietnam was targeting its intelligence-gathering mission, and therefore the Turner Joy was sent to reinforce the Maddox. From the point of view of the Maddox, the attack had been unprovoked, though North Vietnam was under the impression that the Maddox had been involved in the raids on Hon Me and Hon Ngu islands.
Events of August 4
By the night of August 4, the U.S. military had intercepted North Vietnamese communications that led officials to believe that a North Vietnamese attack on its destroyers was being planned. Those communications most likely referred to operations to salvage the torpedo boat that had been damaged in the earlier firefight. That night proved to be a stormy one. The Maddox and Turner Joy moved out to sea, but both reported that they were tracking multiple unidentified vessels approaching their positions. The vessels appeared to be coming from several different directions, and they were impossible to lock onto.
Both ships began firing at what they thought were torpedo boats, and again they sought air support. A plane piloted by Commander James Stockdale joined the action, flying at low altitude to see the enemy ships. Stockdale reported seeing no torpedo boats. Several hours later, Captain John Herrick of the Maddox, after reviewing the events, sent the message, “Review of action makes many reported contacts and torpedoes fired appear doubtful. Freak weather effects on radar and overeager sonarmen may have accounted for many reports. …Suggest complete evaluation before any further action taken.”
Johnson’s response
Johnson and his advisers had approved retaliatory strikes on North Vietnamese naval bases as soon as the reports of the apparent attack of August 4 came in. Moreover, another intercepted report seemed to confirm that the attack had in fact taken place, and thus Herrick’s caution was not taken seriously. That report had been misinterpreted, however. It was in fact a more detailed report about the action on August 2, and there had not actually been an attack on August 4.
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and President Johnson were both convinced of the reality of the second attack, however, and thus they asked Congress to pass the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. It passed the House and Senate easily, and Johnson signed it on August 10.
In 1995 Vo Nguyen Giap, who had been North Vietnam’s military commander during the Vietnam War, acknowledged the August 2 attack on the Maddox but denied that the Vietnamese had launched another attack on August 4, as the Johnson administration had claimed at the time.