French and British armed forces

Napoleon’s army and method of warfare

In France the law of 10 Fructidor year VI (September 5, 1798), had replaced the levies of the Revolution by a regular method of conscription which, with a few modifications, remained in force until 1815. Of the 5,692,164 men belonging to the 18 classes affected by this law, 2,716,567 were called up and 2,022,201 actually incorporated in the army. Troops levied in the 12 years 1800–11, of whom slightly more than 75 percent came from areas French in 1792, accounted for no more than 50 percent of those mobilized between 1798 and 1815. Between the peace of Lunéville and the campaign of 1805, Napoleon formed the best of the armies that he was to lead. Approximately half of its effectives had already seen active service and there had been ample opportunity to absorb recruits into it and to accustom it to maneuvers en masse. No changes were made in tactics or battle formation and the infantry continued to use the Règlement concernant l’exercise et les maneuvers de l’infanterie (Manual for the Training and Maneuvers of Infantry) of 1791. It was by the overall organization of his army and the direction of its movements that Napoleon brought a new form to warfare with the campaign in 1805, in which for the first time 200,000 men employed in divisions and corps were coordinated to a single purpose under one leader. In 1800 the practice had been adopted of forming groups of several divisions under the command of a senior general, but it was with the formation of the Armée des Côtes, or Coastal Army, on the Channel coast that Napoleon introduced the army corps as the definitive basis of army organization. Each corps was given a separate staff and administrative services and was composed ordinarily of three infantry divisions and a division of light cavalry. Separate from the army corps was the cavalry reserve of two divisions of cuirassiers (heavy cavalry) and three or four divisions of dragoons, each with a mobile battery of horse artillery.

The organization of an appropriate general staff, transport, artillery, and rear services was also undertaken. Napoleon’s possession of a general staff, however, did not imply the circumstances associated with the term in later usage. Its chief, Louis-Alexandre Berthier, and the rest of its personnel were required not to think or to act independently but to communicate effectively between Napoleon and his corps commanders. There was no real training for staff work, and the staff officers were chosen haphazardly, as Napoleon reserved the control of a campaign to himself (though he allowed his corps commanders much freedom in the execution of his orders). He was content to employ largely second-rate men who were not always adequate to the parts allotted to them under his supervision and who were to show still more serious deficiencies when they became theatre commanders.

Since he lacked the means to provide for more systematic methods, Napoleon’s campaigns had to yield prompt and decisive results. The virtual abandonment of traditional lines of communication in favour of an independent “line of operations” directed against the enemy army and based on a convenient centre for immediate rear services, together with the reduction of supply trains to a minimum, conferred great strategic benefits so long as victory was soon obtained. The system, however, was not amenable to prolonged campaigning or to the conduct of a successful retreat, in which the army would quickly exhaust its supplies, since its customary measures of pillage and forced requisition were less efficient than the more normal organized raising of supplies for payment. Nor could the system be easily applied in comparatively unproductive areas or over great distances—perfected in western Europe and in northern Italy, it was far less practicable in the east.

Napoleon did not prescribe the infantry formations to be used by his corps commanders, whose varying combinations were often ineffective and wasteful of manpower, especially in the frontal attacks that he favoured in his later battles. He made no attempt of any consequence to introduce the two-rank firing that the British used to such advantage against opponents whose ranks were at least three deep. He put great emphasis on his cavalry, which screened the movements of army corps, intervened at crucial moments in battle and conducted the vigorous pursuits so profitable after a victorious engagement. With a remarkable grasp of the strategic implications of a situation, Napoleon was preeminent in disposing his army corps to discover the whereabouts of enemy forces, to head them off from retreat, to obstruct their concentration, and to bring them to battle. Mobility and the careful dispersal of semi-independent army corps so as to control an extensive area were often decisive factors in Napoleon’s campaigns.

British military and naval strength

The British regular army had been employed predominantly in colonial warfare, for which it had been freed by calling up the militia to supplement home defense. Even so the demand for men had outrun the supply of volunteers, and in July 1799 the government had begun paying a bounty to militiamen who would volunteer for service with the regular army. The strength of the latter was reduced to 95,800 after the Peace of Amiens. Inevitably the British attached primary importance to their navy. In 1803, whereas the French had 23 ships of the line and 25 frigates and could call upon the Dutch Republic’s 15 capital ships (of which, however, only 5 were in commission), the British had 34 ships of the line and 86 frigates in service and 77 ships of the line and 49 frigates in reserve. At the close of the war the British had 240 ships of the line and 317 frigates against the French 103 and 55.